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subjects received. If people typically do not use abstract rules analogous to those 
of standard logic, then training on abstract principles of standard logic alone 
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know how to map such rules onto concrete instances. Training results obtained in 
both a laboratory and a classroom setting confirmed our hypothesis: Training was 
effective only when abstract principles were coupled with examples of selection 
problems, which served to elucidate the mapping between abstract principles and 
concrete instances. In contrast, a third experiment demonstrated that brief ab- 
stract training on a pragmatic reasoning schema had a substantial impact on sub- 
jects’ reasoning about problems that were interpretable in terms of the schema, 
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How do people reason about problems in everyday life? Two views 
have dominated theories of deductive reasoning. According to one view 
people use syntactic, domain-independent rules of logic. Some philoso- 
phers (e.g., Goodman, 1965) and psychologists (including Piaget and his 
followers) who are sympathetic to this view believe that these rules cor- 
respond closely to those in standard logic. Substantial evidence shows, 
however, that typical college students often do not reason in accord with 
the rules of standard logic (see Evans, 1982, for a review). Partly in re- 
sponse to this evidence, other proponents of the syntactic view have pro- 
posed that people use a natural logic which consists of a repertory of 
syntactic rules that people untutored in standard logic naturally use (e.g., 
Braine, 1978; Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Rips, 1983). The empirical 
adequacy of the natural-logic approach has also been challenged, how- 
ever (Johnson-Laird, 1983, chap. 2). 
Partly in response to the empirical difficulties encountered by the syn- 
tactic view, an opposing view has developed that holds that people do not 
use syntactic rules at all but instead develop much narrower rules tied to 
particular content domains in which people have actual experience. Such 
specific rules, or perhaps simple memory of examples and counterex- 
amples, are used to evaluate the validity of propositions (e.g., Griggs & 
Cox, 1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Reich & Ruth, 1982). 
In contrast to both the extreme syntactic view and the specilic-experi- 
ence view, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that people often reason 
using pragmatic reasoning schemas: clusters of rules that are highly gen- 
eralized and abstracted but nonetheless defined with respect to classes of 
goals and types of relationships. An example of a pragmatic reasoning 
schema is the set of abstracted rules for situations involving “permis- 
sion,” that is, situations in which some action A may be taken only if 
some precondition B is satisfied. If the semantic aspects of a problem 
suggest to people that they are dealing with a permission situation, then 
all of the rules about permissions in general can be called on, including 
“If action A is to be taken, then precondition B must be satisfied,” “Ac- 
tion A is to be taken only if precondition B is satisfied,” “If precondition 
B is not satisfied, then action A must not be taken,” and so on. A related 
example is the schema for situations involving “obligation,” that is, situ- 
ations in which the occurrence of some condition A incurs the necessity 
of taking some action B. Rules about obligations are similar to but not 
identical with rules about permissions. For instance, the rule “If condi- 
tion A occurs, then obligation B arises” implies “If obligation B does not 
arise, then condition A must not have occurred,” but not “Condition A 
occurs only if obligation B arises.” 
The rules composing these schemas are the ones that people call on 
when solving problems of various kinds. Since the rules of some of the 
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schemas lead to the same solution as do the rules of standard logic, 
people’s answers to problems will often appear consistent with those of 
standard logic. This consistency does not mean that their answers have 
been produced by the application of syntactic logical rules, since the 
same people will at other times produce answers that violate those same 
rules of logic. This occurs when the rules of the schema used lead to 
conclusions that differ from those that follow from standard logic. By 
manipulating the semantic features of the problems to evoke different 
reasoning schemas, one should be able to manipulate whether or not 
people’s answers are correct according to standard logic. 
Cheng and Holyoak obtained several empirical results that speak 
strongly for the existence of reasoning schemas. Two of these findings 
involve Wason’s (1966) selection task. In one version of the Wason task 
subjects are presented with four cards, which show an “A”, a “B”, a 
“4”, and a “7”. They are informed that the cards have letters on one side 
and numbers on the other, and are then given the rule, “If a card has an 
‘A’ on one side, then it has a ‘4’ on the other.” The task is to indicate all 
and only those cards that must be turned over to determine whether the 
rule is violated. Interpreting the if-then connective as the material condi- 
tional in standard logic, the correct answer in this example is to turn over 
the cards showing “A” and “7”. More generally, the rule used in such 
problems is a conditional statement, i’p then 4, and the relevant cases 
are p (because if p is the case it must be established that 4 is also the 
case) and not-q (because if it is not the case that LJ it must be established 
that it is also not the case that p). 
When the selection problem is presented in an arbitrary form, as in the 
above example, fewer than 10% of college students typically produce the 
correct answer. A frequently chosen pattern is “A and 4.” One of the 
errors in such an answer is omission of the card showing “7”, indicating 
a failure to see the equivalence of a conditional statement and its contra- 
positive (i.e., “If a card does not have a ‘4’ on one side, then it does not 
have an ‘A’ on the other”). Other errors include the fallacy of affirming 
the consequent (which corresponds to insistence on examining “4”, 
which is unnecessary because the rule does not specify anything about 
the obverse of cards with a “4” on one side), and denying the antecedent 
(which corresponds to insistence on examining “B”, which also is unnec- 
essary because the rule does not specify anything about cards that do not 
have an “A” on one side). 
Cheng and Holyoak pointed out that the schema for “permission” 
should be particularly useful in performing the selection task because the 
rules that comprise it lead to the same responses as follow from the mate- 
rial conditional. In one of their experiments subjects were presented with 
a selection problem based on an abstract description of a permission situ- 
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ation: “If one is to take action ‘A’, then one must first satisfy precondi- 
tion ‘P’.” Subjects were also given an arbitrary card version that is syn- 
tactically identical to the permission problem. About 60% of subjects 
solved the abstract permission problem correctly, versus only about 20% 
who correctly solved the card problem. The fact that a purely abstract 
description of a permission situation produces facilitation supports the 
schema hypothesis over proposals based on either purely syntactic rules 
or specific experiences. 
In another experiment, Cheng and Holyoak demonstrated that pro- 
viding an explicit purpose for a rule that would otherwise seem arbitrary 
could serve to cue the permission schema and hence facilitate perfor- 
mance. For example, the rule “If a passenger’s form says ‘Entering’ on 
one side, then the other side must include ‘cholera,’ ” was rationalized 
by explaining that it involved a regulation requiring that travelers show 
proof of cholera vaccination in order to enter a country. The benefit con- 
veyed by provision of a purpose is inexplicable according to either the 
specific-experience view or the syntactic view. Since subjects had no ex- 
perience with the specific content in question and hence no memory for 
counterexamples to the rule, improvement due to provision of a purpose 
could not be attributed to processes consistent with the specific-experi- 
ence view. On the other hand, improvement could not be attributed plau- 
sibly to manipulation of the syntactic properties of the problems either, 
since the added purpose did not affect the logical structure of the 
problems. 
The notion of pragmatic reasoning schemas, represented as sets of in- 
ferential rules (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986), is essen- 
tially a generalization of similar ideas that have been proposed to explain 
people’s causal and inductive reasoning. Kelley (1972, 1973) suggested 
that people make causal attributions in part by relying on “causal 
schemas.” These are highly generalized, domain-independent, but not 
purely syntactic rule systems for analyzing causality. People may have, 
for example, a schema for multiple sufficient causes, where a given effect 
could be produced solely by operation of a single cause, but a number of 
different causes could play that role. People’s search for causal candi- 
dates and their degree of certainty about the effects of a given causal 
candidate are influenced by the particular causal schema they bring to the 
analysis of a situation. 
Pragmatic reasoning schemas are also related to Johnson-Laird’s con- 
cept of “mental models.” For example, Johnson-Laird (1983, p. 416) dis- 
cusses a representation of “ownership” in terms of such inferences as, 
“If I own something then it is permissible for me to use it.” In our terms, 
the concept of ownership is a pragmatic schema based in part on the yet 
more general permission and obligation schemas. However, the focus of 
Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental models is not on the role of pragmatic 
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inference rules in reasoning, but rather on a domain-independent scheme 
for manipulating sets that are represented in terms of tokens for their 
individual members. The theory has been developed in most detail as an 
account of reasoning with syllogisms in which the premises specify arbi- 
trary set relations (e.g., “All of the beekeepers are artists”). The theory 
attributes reasoning errors in this domain largely to limitations on 
memory capacity. In contrast, the present theory explains errors (as de- 
fined by the dictates of standard logic) in terms of the ease of mapping 
concrete situations into pragmatic schemas, as well as the degree to 
which the evoked schemas generate inferences that in fact conform to 
standard logic. 
People not only have deductive reasoning schemas, but also inductive 
reasoning schemas. Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983) and 
Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) have proposed that people often reason 
about events using sets of heuristics or intuitive rules of thumb that are 
informal equivalents of statistical rules such as the law of large numbers 
(LLN), the regression principle, and so on. Like causal schemas, these 
are clusters of inferential rules for predicting and explaining events. They 
are invoked for reasoning about events that are perceived to be subject to 
random variations. 
Just as Cheng and Holyoak showed that people can solve selection 
problems if they are given cues that serve to trigger the permission 
schema, Nisbett et al. (1983) (as well as Jepson, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1983, 
and Fong et al., 1986) showed that people can produce solutions that are 
in accord with statistical requirements when the problem contains cues 
about variability or chance that encourage the use of statistical heuristics. 
For example, Fong et al. gave subjects a problem about a businesswoman 
who eats out frequently when she travels to different cities. She returns 
often to restaurants where she got an excellent meal on her first trip, but 
is usually disappointed. Most statistically untrained subjects give a causal 
explanation such as “her hopes were too high” or “the chefs change a 
lot.” But if a cue as to the variability characteristic of restaurant meals is 
presented, many more subjects give a statistical explanation, such as 
“maybe it was just by chance that she got such a good meal the first time; 
there are probably more restaurants that can turn out an occasional ex- 
cellent meal than restaurants that consistently do that.” 
Subjects are not only easily cued to use statistical heuristics, but they 
can also readily be taught to use, and to improve, their statistical heu- 
ristics. For example, subjects with no statistical education only rarely 
give a statistical answer for the uncued version of the restaurant problem 
above, but increasing amounts of statistical training increase the likeli- 
hood of a statistical answer. The great majority of subjects with postgrad- 
uate training in statistics gave a statistical answer to the problem. 
Even more dramatically, very brief training session in LLN were 
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helpful in encouraging subjects to apply LLN to problems such as the 
restaurant problem (Fong et al., 1986). This was true even for completely 
abstract training, in which the concepts of “sample” and “population” 
were defined formally and illustrated using problems involving balls in an 
urn. Fong et al. argued that such abstract training could be effective be- 
cause subjects already had an informal, approximate grasp of LLN and 
an ability to apply it to actual events. Thus, they could take immediate 
advantage of formal improvements to their intuitive understanding. Con- 
sistent with this view, Fong et al. found that brief instruction showing 
subjects how to model example problems in terms of LLN, without any 
additional instruction in the abstract nature of LLN, was also effective in 
encouraging subjects to use LLN. Fong et al. argued that this could only 
be true if subjects already had an intuitive version of LLN and could 
readily generalize from the examples to improvements in this intuitive 
version. The present investigations are modeled on those we have just 
described. We test several hypotheses. 
First, if people have pragmatic reasoning schemas corresponding to the 
“permission schema,” the “obligation schema,” and so on, then it 
should be easy to encourage them to use these schemas by presenting 
them with semantic cues designed to trigger them. Triggering a schema 
that produces the same solution to an if-then problem as does the mate- 
rial conditional, such as the permission schema, should help subjects to 
solve it. Conversely, triggering a schema that does not produce the same 
solution as the material conditional should be less helpful. 
Second, unlike abstract training in LLN, which produces a marked 
improvement in peoples’ ability to apply LLN to concrete problems, ab- 
stract training in the material conditional should produce little improve- 
ment in people’s ability to apply the rule system to concrete problems. 
Since in our view the rule system is not used in natural contexts, people 
lack the requisite skills to interpret problems in terms of the material 
conditional, and hence would profit little from instruction in it. Similarly, 
simply providing subjects with a few example problems solved by the 
application of the material conditional would likewise produce little ben- 
efit, since few subjects would be able to spontaneously induce the ab- 
stract rules from the examples. Thus, if people are to be able to use the 
rule system at all they must be given training both on abstract rules and 
on how to apply the rule system to specific examples. 
Third, abstract training in pragmatic reasoning schemas, like abstract 
training in LLN, and unlike abstract training in the material conditional, 
should produce improvement in ability to use the schemas. Since rules 
for interpreting concrete problems in terms of the abstract rules of rea- 
soning schemas already exist, improvement on the abstract rules should 
carry over to improved ability to solve concrete problems. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to assess the influence of reasoning 
schemas on performance on the selection task, as well as to assess the 
usefulness of different training procedures. 
If people interpret if-then in terms of reasoning schemas, selection 
problems that evoke different pragmatic reasoning schemas might lead 
systematically to different response patterns. We tested this prediction 
by measuring the effect of three types of selection problems on reasoning 
performance. The problems described relations that we thought would be 
suggestive of permission situations, relations with a causal flavor that we 
thought would invite a converse assumption (i.e., assuming if q then p 
when given ifp then q), and relations that were purely arbitrary. The 
pragmatic schema hypothesis leads us to expect that performance would 
be better for permission problems than for problems with a converse bias 
or arbitrary problems. Performance on converse-bias problems should be 
no worse than for arbitrary problems, because the latter do not evoke any 
useful schema. In addition to the above three types of problems, all of 
which involve conditional rules, we included problems that explicitly 
stated biconditional rules. 
We also assessed the effect of different training procedures. The design 
with respect to training was the same as that employed by Fong et al. 
(1986). Subjects received either abstract rule training in the conditional, 
training in how to apply the conditional to concrete example problems, 
both, or neither. Consistent with the view that subjects already possessed 
an intuitive version of LLN, Fong et al. found that abstract rule training 
was effective by itself, as was example training. In contrast, we antici- 
pated that since people do not possess rules corresponding to the condi- 
tional, neither type of training would be effective by itself. Abstract rule 
training should not be effective because subjects have no means of inter- 
preting problems so that the rules can be applied. Example training, 
showing how to apply the conditional, should also not be effective by 




Eighty students at the University of Michigan were randomly assigned in equal numbers 
to each of four training conditions: (1) Rule training, (2) Examples training, (3) Rule plus 
Examples training, and (4) No training. None of the subjects had previously received any 
formal training in logic. 
Training Materials 
Rule training. Subjects receiving rule training read a seven-page booklet consisting of an 
exposition on conditional statements, followed by an inference exercise. These materials 
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are presented in Appendix A. The exposition consisted of an explanation of the equivalence 
between a conditional statement and its contrapositive, as well as an explanation of the two 
common fallacies of aftirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. The contraposi- 
tive was explained in part by the use of a truth table, in part by Euler diagrams that used 
concentric circles to show the relations between a conditional statement and its contraposi- 
tive, and in part by an illustrative conditional statement. The illustrative statement ex- 
pressed a realistic causal relation. Similarly, the fallacies were explained in part by diagrams 
and in part by alternative possible causes related to the illustrative statement. 
At the end of rule training, subjects were given an inference exercise in which they were 
to select statement(s) that can be validly inferred from each of three given conditional state- 
ments. The statements were all in the form of ifp then 4. The randomly ordered possible 
inferences were in the following forms: if nor-p rhen not-q (invalid), if not-q rhen nor-p 
(valid), and ifq rhen p (invalid). Subjects were given immediate feedback on correctness, 
followed by a brief explanation of the correct answer. 
Examples training. Subjects receiving examples training were requested to attempt to 
solve two selection problems. They were given immediate feedback about their perfor- 
mance. One example was the “department store” problem used by D’Andrade (1982), and 
the other was a problem in which a catalog of paintings had to be checked to determine 
whether “all the Cubist paintings are by Picasso.” Neither example bore any obvious simi- 
larities to the later test problems. The correct answer to each example was explained in 
terms specific to the particular problem. 
Rule plus example training consisted of the materials for the rule condition followed by 
those for the examples condition. The only further addition was that for these subjects the 
explanation of the correct answer for each example was couched in terms of the abstract 
rules they had just learned. 
Test Problems 
Eight selection problems were used, consisting of two of each of three types of problems 
involving a conditional rule and two problems involving a biconditional rule. The problems 
are presented in Table 1. Arbitrary problems (the Wason “card” problem and the “bird” 
problem) bore little relationship to the prior knowledge subjects were likely to have. Con- 
verse-bias problems were more realistic; however, subjects’ prior knowledge was expected 
to encourage assumption of the converse (i.e., if q rhen p). The “washing labels” problem 
involved a regulation for which causal knowledge would suggest an “if and only if” inter- 
pretation, and the “electrical charges” problem involved a causal regularity in which only a 
single cause was likely to be considered, also leading to an “if and only if” reading. The 
permission problems (“cholera” and “drinking age”) are readily interpreted as permis- 
sions, which should not encourage assumption of the converse, but instead should yield the 
same responses as follow from the conditional of standard logic. Finally, the biconditional 
problems stated explicitly that the converse of a conditional rule was also true. The content 
of the biconditional problems was relatively arbitrary. The anticipation was that this arbi- 
trary content would block application of any pragmatic reasoning schema and that perfor- 
mance on these problems would be poor. 
Each problem described a brief scenario. Within each scenario was embedded a condi- 
tional or biconditional rule, a question asking the subject to determine the correctness of the 
rule, and a list of the four possible cases @, nor-p, q, and nor-q) from which the subject was 
to select. These cases were randomly ordered. 
In order to provide a second measure of the effectiveness of abstract training, subjects 
were asked to judge which of a series of transformations of a conditional rule retained the 
basic meaning of the rule itself. The conditional rules in this equivaknce judgment task 
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lence judgment problems consisted of conditional rules excerpted from the six corre- 
sponding selection problems, each followed by a randomly ordered list of four transforma- 
tions of each of these rules. The rules were always in the form ifp then q. The forms used 
as transformations were a simple syntactic variation, q ifp (valid); the contrapositive, if 
not-q then not-p (valid); the converse, if q then p (invalid); and the inverse, if nor-p then 
nor-q (invalid). Subjects were to judge which of the transformations retained the basic 
meaning of the corresponding rules. This test was similar to the inference exercise included 
in the rule and rule plus examples training conditions. Biconditional rules were not included 
in this test. 
Results and Discussions 
Results on the selection task were analyzed using analysis of variance 
with problem type as a within-subject variable and training condition as a 
between-subject variable. Two measures of performance were analyzed: 
Whether a subject made at least one error on a problem (i.e., failed to 
solve the problem perfectly) and whether he or she made each of the four 
possible kinds of errors. For conditional problems, the four kinds of 
errors in the selection task were failing to select p, failing to select not-q, 
selecting 9, and selecting nor-p. These errors correspond, respectively, to 
errors on modus ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent, and 
denying the antecedent. For biconditional problems the correct response 
was to select all four alternatives. 
Since the two dependent measures of overall performance on a 
problem-whether a subject made at least one error and the number of 
errors-reflected the same pattern of results, statistics for only the 
former measure are reported as an indicator of overall performance on a 
problem. Performance on conditional and biconditional problems were 
analyzed separately. For conditional problems, type of problem and 
training condition did not interact according to either measure of perfor- 
mance (F < 1). Accordingly, results for type of problem and training 
condition are reported separately, each collapsed over the other variable. 
Table 2 presents the percentages of subjects (collapsed over training con- 
ditions) who made errors of various types on each of the four kinds of 
selection problems. Table 3 presents the percentage of subjects in each 
training condition (collapsed over conditional selection problems) who 
made errors of various types on the same task. Half-widths of 95% conti- 
dence intervals for various pairwise differences between means are indi- 
cated at the bottom of each table of results. 
Effects of Problem Type 
Consistent with our reasoning schema hypothesis, performance dif- 
fered markedly across types of conditional problems, F(2,152) = 64.7, p 
< .OOl, for the percentage of subjects making at least one error. Fewest 
subjects made at least one error on permission problems (34 + 6%), more 
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TABLE 2 
Percentage Errors in Selection Task as a Function of Problem Type (Experiment I) 
Problem type P 
Type of error 
At least 






15 2 5 62 65 12 81 r+_ 6 
16 ? 5 42 34 17 66 + 6 
5?5 24 8 2 34 5 6 
14 2 7 48 14 54 80 k 9 
Note. Error margins indicated in the table are half-widths of 95% confidence intervals for 
the respective conditions. Numbers in the three center columns have the same half-widths 
as the left-most numbers in the corresponding rows. The half-width of a 95% confidence 
interval for pairwise comparisons between mean frequencies of particular errors on the 
three types of conditional problems is 7. The corresponding half-width for comparisons 
between the percentages of subjects who made at least one error on various types of 
problems is 8. 
subjects did so on converse-bias problems (66 + 6%), and still more sub- 
jects did so on arbitrary problems (81 2 6%). Moreover, type of error 
interacted strongly with type of problem, F(6,456) = 20.7, p < .OOl. In 
particular, frequency of erroneously selecting q was highest for arbitrary 
problems (65 2 5%), next highest for converse-bias problems (34 lr 5%), 
and lowest for permission problems (8 * 5%), confirming our prediction 
that permission problems have a lower tendency to invite assumption of 
the converse than the other two types of problems. Interestingly, the fre- 
quency of selecting 4 was much higher for arbitrary than for converse- 
bias problems. Because arbitrary problems do not evoke any pragmatic 
schemas, subjects would have to fall back on whatever syntactic logical 
rules are available or on nonlogical strategies such as “matching” 
(Manktelow & Evans, 1979). A matching strategy would produce ap- 
parent converse errors for our arbitrary problems. Frequency of failure 
to select not-q similarly depended on type of problem, being highest for 
arbitrary problems (62 + 5%), next highest for converse-bias problems 
(42 + 5%), and lowest for permission problems (24 2 5%). 
Many fewer subjects (17 -+ 5%) made the other two types of errors 
(i.e., failure to select p or erroneous selection of nor-p) for all three types 
of conditional problems. Permission problems again produced fewer 
errors than either arbitrary or converse-bias problems, which produced 
comparable percentages of errors for these two cases. It is particularly 
noteworthy that the permission problems yielded more accurate perfor- 
mance even for the choice of p, which corresponds to modus ponens, 
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perhaps the most plausibly psychological of all the syntactic inference 
rules in standard logic and in Braine’s (1978) natural logic.’ 
The two permission problems can be used to test the domain speci- 
ficity hypothesis, which claims that only rules with which subjects have 
prior familiarity will yield good performance. For most subjects the 
“drinking age” rule was presumably much more familiar than the 
“cholera inoculation” rule. Although the percentage of subjects making 
at least one error was marginally lower for the more familiar rule (29 + 
7% versus 39 + 7%, p = .05), even the relatively unfamiliar rule pro- 
duced a much lower error rate than any converse-bias or arbitrary 
problem @ < .002). Thus subjects were able to reason in accord with 
standard logic even for a relatively unfamiliar rule if it evoked a permis- 
sion schema. These results indicate that while specific experiences may 
play a role in reasoning, they cannot account for the large effect of type 
of problem on performance. 
Performance on biconditional problems was poor: 80 + 9% of the sub- 
jects (averaged over training conditions) made at least one error on such 
problems. Because all four cases should be selected, the four types of 
errors for biconditional problems all indicate failure to select. As Table 2 
indicates, the most frequent errors were failure to select the two negated 
cases. Biconditional problems, unlike permission problems, cannot be 
solved by application of the permission schema. Futhermore, the arbi- 
trary formulation of the particular biconditionals used presumably dis- 
couraged application of any pragmatic schema, so that subjects’ perfor- 
mance on these problems was poor. 
Training Effects 
It may be seen in Table 3 that the percentage of subjects who make at 
least one error on conditional problems varied significantly across 
training conditions, F(3,76) = 6.04, p < .Ol. Neither rule training by it- 
self nor examples training by itself was effective. In contrast, rule 
training coupled with examples training significantly decreased the fre- 
quencies of three types of errors-failure to select p, failure to select 
not-q, and erroneous selection of q. These effects are reflected in a sub- 
’ Problem type did not strongly influence errors in the equivalence judgment task. Over 
all types, the error rate was 33 ? 3% for failing to select the syntactic variation, 48 _’ 3% for 
failing to select the contrapositive, 6 * 3% for selecting the converse, and 4% for selecting 
the inverse. Contrary to our expectations, the frequency of converse errors was low even 
for the converse-bias problems (10 2 4%), and the frequency of the contrapositive error 
was not lower for permission problems (46 1?: 4%). than for other types. We have no conft- 
dent explanation for the differences between the effects of problem type observed for equiv- 
alence judgments versus selection task performance. 
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TABLE 3 
Percentage Errors in Selection Task as a Function of Training Condition (Experiment 1) 
Training condition P 
Type of error 
At least 
not-q 4 not-p one error 
Rules & examples 529 27 28 8 39 2 12 
Rules only 14 t 9 48 33 7 65 2 12 
Examples only IO f 9 45 37 12 62 + 12 
Control 18 r 9 51 44 14 75 k 12 
Note. Error margins indicated in the table are half-widths of 95% confidence intervals for 
the respective conditions. Numbers in the three center columns have the same half-widths 
as the left-most numbers in the corresponding rows. The half-width of a 95% confidence 
interval for pairwise comparisons between mean frequencies of particular errors for the 
three training groups is 12. The corresponding half-width for comparisons between the per- 
centages of subjects who made at least one error for various training conditions is 17. 
stantial decrease in the mean percentage of subjects who made at least 
one error on a problem, from 75 t 12% to 39 k 12%.2 
The above pattern is quite different from that observed by Fong et al. 
(1986) for the effects of training on use of LLN. They found both rule 
training and examples training to be effective in isolation, and the effects 
of both were approximately additive. The present pattern of results sup- 
ports our contention that the material conditional is not a rule system that 
subjects use naturally. Thus rule training is ineffective because subjects 
have no ability to apply it to concrete problems and examples training is 
ineffective because subjects have no intuitive grasp of the rule they are 
’ For the equivalence judgment task, training interacted strongly with type of error, 
F(9,228) = 14.0, p < .OOl. None of the training procedures had any significant effects on the 
converse and inverse. However, rule training, either alone or coupled with examples, re- 
duced errors on the contrapositive by large and significant amounts, from 73 2 11% for the 
control group, to 19 2 11% for the subjects who received rule training alone, and 28 2 11% 
for subjects who received both rule and examples training. Surprisingly, rule training, either 
alone or together with examples, greatly increased errors on the syntactic variation, from 17 
? 11% for the control group, to 55 t 11% for subjects who received abstract training alone, 
and 49 2 11% for subjects who received both rule and examples training. This negative 
effect of rule training may have resulted from the fact that the inference exercise included as 
part of the rule training did not include examples of the syntactic variation. It may be that 
by alerting subjects to fallacies of which they were previously unaware, rule training in- 
stilled a general reluctance to accept unfamiliar transformations, leading to the detrimental 
effect observed. In any case, the fact that ruIe training affected performance on both the 
contrapositive and the syntactic variation indicates that the lack of an effect of rule training 
alone in the selection task was not due to subjects’ simply learning nothing from our training 
protocol. Rule training by itself did alter subjects’ performance on a direct inference task, 
even though what was learned could not be readily applied in the selection task. 
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being shown how to apply. Because the confidence intervals for pairwise 
differences between means are quite wide, however, the null hypothesis 
that neither rule nor examples training alone yielded any benefit cannot 
be accepted with confidence. In Experiment 2 we examine the effects of 
a greatly augmented rule-training procedure, namely, exposure to an en- 
tire course in logic. 
Training did not affect the percentage of subjects who made at least 
one error on biconditional problems, F < 1. Training and type of error 
did not interact, F < 1. These results indicate that training on conditional 
reasoning did not transfer to solution of biconditional problems. If sub- 
jects had an intuitive appreciation of the material conditional, then it 
might be expected that any advantage gained by training on the condi- 
tional would result in some degree of improved understanding of bicondi- 
tional problems. 
In sum, the semantic content of problems significantly influenced rea- 
soning performance. In particular, permission problems yielded better 
performance than either converse-bias or arbitrary problems, confirming 
our reasoning schema hypothesis. Training on the conditional in standard 
logic, when coupled with examples of conditional selection problems, 
clearly improved performance on subsequent conditional selection 
problems, though training effects did not transfer to biconditional 
problems. Training on either standard logic, by itself, or on examples of 
selection problems, by itself, failed to produce significant improvements, 
but firm conclusions cannot be drawn from the latter results. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that training in standard logic, 
when coupled with training on examples of selection problems, leads to 
improved performance on subsequent selection problems. In contrast, 
training on rules of logic without such examples failed to significantly 
improve performance. This is consistent with our view that the material 
conditional is not part of people’s intuitive reasoning repertoire, and 
hence they lack any ability to put abstract rule training to use. An ob- 
vious possibility, however, is that our experimental “micro-course” on 
the logic of the conditional was simply too minimal to convey much ben- 
efit. To assess this possibility, Experiment 2 examined the impact of a 
much broader and more prolonged abstract training condition: a one- 
semester undergraduate course in standard logic. 
Course Con tent 
Method 
Two introductory logic classes provided subjects for Experiment 2. One class was held at 
the Ann Arbor campus of the University of Michigan and one at the branch campus at 
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Dearborn. Both classes involved about 40 h of lectures and covered topics in propositional 
logic, including modus ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent, and denying the 
antecedent, and the distinction between the conditional and the biconditional. The textbook 
in one class was Elementary Logic (Simco & James, 1982), and in the other it was Intro&~- 
tion to Logic (Copi, 1982). In both classes the treatment of the valid and invalid inference 
patterns was primarily formal. While meaningful conditional sentences were introduced in 
lectures to illustrate the inference rules and fallacies, emphasis was placed on formal logical 
analyses (i.e., truth-table analyses and construction of proofs). Neither class provided any 
exposure to the selection task or other psychological research on deductive reasoning. 
Procedure and Subjects 
A pretest and post-test were administered to each class. The pretest was given in the first 
week of class before any discussion of the conditional had taken place; the post-test was 
given in the final week of the semester. To generate matched test materials, the eight selec- 
tion problems used in Experiment 1 were divided into two sets of four. Each set consisted 
of one of each of the four problem types (arbitrary, converse bias, permission, and bicondi- 
tional). The assignment of the two resulting sets of test materials to the pretest and post-test 
was counterbalanced across subjects. 
The test sessions took place during regular class meetings: however, they were intro- 
duced to the students as a psychology experiment rather than as part of the course. In each 
session subjects were asked simply to complete booklets with four selection problems. No 
feedback of any kind was provided until after completion of the post-test. Only data from 
students who completed both the pretest and the post-test were analyzed, so that the effect 
of logic training could be treated as a within-subjects variable. Across the two classes a total 
of 53 students completed the study. 
Results and Discussion 
The pattern of results did not differ across the two classes that pro- 
vided subjects; accordingly, all results are reported using the combined 
data from both classes. The percentages of subjects who made errors of 
various types on conditional selection problems (collapsing over arbi- 
trary, converse-bias, and permission types) on the pretest and post-test 
are presented in Table 4. No significant improvement was obtained in 
TABLE 4 




Type of error 
At least 
P not-q 4 not-p one error 
20 2 6 55 41 18 75 2 5 
14 2 6 58 31 12 72 k 5 
Note. Error margins indicated in the table are half-widths of 95% confidence intervals for 
the respective conditions. Numbers in the three center columns have the same half-widths 
as the left-most numbers in the corresponding rows. The half-width of a 95% confidence 
interval for pairwise comparisons between mean frequencies of particular errors on the 
pretest and the post-test is 8. The corresponding half-width for comparisons between the 
percentages of subjects who made at least one error on the pretest and the post-test is 7. 
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percentage of problems on which at least one error was made. The mean 
improvement was a bare 3 + 7%, c < 1. T tests performed on each error 
type separately revealed that the only type of error for which the im- 
provement was individually significant was erroneous selection of the q 
alternative, an error that decreased by 10 f 8% from pretest to post-test. 
No interactions involving training and type of conditional problem ap- 
proached significance. Performance on biconditional problems showed 
no sign of improvement between the pretest and post-test. The per- 
centage of subjects making at least one error on the biconditional 
problem was 81 ? 8% on the pretest and 87 + 8% on the post-test, a 
nonsignificant increase in error rate, t < 1. No significant changes in the 
frequency of individual error types were obtained for the biconditional 
problems. Overall, then, the only apparent influence of a one-semester 
logic course was a small decrease in the tendency to make the error cor- 
responding to affirming the consequent (i.e., selecting the q alternative) 
for conditional selection problems. 
The weak effect of a semester’s training in logic contrasts dramatically 
with the effects of semantic variations in description of the selection 
problem. Table 5 presents the percentages of subjects who made the 
various types of errors for each of the four problem types, collapsing 
over the pretest and post-test (since no interactions between logic 
training and problem type approached significance). The impact of 
problem type was very similar to that observed in Experiment 1. The 
three types of conditional problems differed in both percentage of sub- 
jects making at least one error and percentage of errors on individual 
TABLE 5 
Percentage Errors as a Function of Problem Type (Experiment 2) 
Problem type P 
Type of error 
At least 






23 zi 7 71 58 21 91 2 6 
19 f 7 69 37 19 87 -r- 6 
10 ? 7 30 12 6 40 5 6 
24 k 8 64 25 61 84 * 9 
Nore. Error margins indicated in the table are half-widths of 95% confidence intervals for 
the respective conditions. Numbers in the three center columns have the same half-widths 
as the left-most numbers in the corresponding rows. The half-width of a 95% confidence 
interval for pairwise comparisons between mean frequencies of particular errors on the 
three types of conditional problems is 10. The corresponding half-width for comparisons 
between the percentages of subjects who made at least one error on various types of 
problems is 9. 
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alternatives, F(2,104) = 63.1, p < .OOl, for the latter analysis. Perfor- 
mance was much more accurate for the permission type than for the 
other two conditional types. The interaction between conditional 
problem type and type of error was also significant, F(6,312) = 6.90, p < 
.OOl. As the data in Table 5 indicate, fewer errors of all types were made 
for permission problems than for the other problem types. The patterns 
of errors for the arbitrary and converse-bias types were similar except 
that fewer erroneous selections of the q alternative were made for the 
latter type. For all three conditional problems, the most common error 
was failure to select the nor-q case. 
The pattern of errors for biconditional problems was also similar to 
that observed in Experiment 1. Most subjects (84 & 9%) made at least 
one error per biconditional problem, and the bulk of the individual errors 
involved failures to select the two negative cases, not-q and not-p. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
We have found that abstract training in the logic of the conditional does 
not by itself have much effect on the way people reason about problems 
that could potentially be solved by its use. In contrast, problems that lend 
themselves to interpretation in terms of pragmatic reasoning schemas are 
solved by a large fraction of subjects. If this is because people normally 
solve problems using such schemas, and if Fong et al. (1986) are correct 
in their assertion that even purely abstract training in naturally occurring 
rule systems can be effective in encouraging people to use them, then it 
ought to be possible to improve people’s deductive reasoning by training 
on pragmatic reasoning schemas. 
In Experiment 3 we tested this possibility. We provided subjects with 
an abstract statement of the notion of “obligations,” together with a de- 
scription of the procedures necessary to check whether an obligation has 
been carried out. The anticipation was that this training would facilitate 
subjects’ solution of problems that are in fact semantically interpretable 
in terms of the obligation notion. We predicted that subjects would not 
need training on how to map the abstract rules of obligations onto ex- 
amples of particular problems. Since, as in the case of the schema for 
LLN, some form of an obligation schema is naturally induced, mapping 
rules must already exist. Schema training could nonetheless improve per- 
formance in at least three ways: (1) by providing subjects with more gen- 
eral mapping rules for interpreting situations in terms of the obligation 
schema; (2) by ensuring that the inferential rules attached to the schema 
are valid; and (3) by simply providing checking procedures consistent 
with the conditional that can be applied to even arbitrary problems. 
It was important to establish that it is not merely the latter checking 
procedure training which is effective, however. Griggs (1983) has argued 
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that facilitation can be obtained merely by virtue of orienting subjects 
toward detecting violations of a rule. Thus, in a separate, “contingency” 
training condition, we trained subjects in the use of checking procedures 
for so-called contingencies involving the relation between one event or its 
absence and another event or its absence. It was anticipated that the 
latter procedure would have little effect on subjects’ solution of semanti- 
cally interpretable problems, since such problems would be understood 
either in terms of a reasoning schema that maps onto the conditional, in 
which case the checking procedures would be redundant, or in terms of a 
reasoning schema that does not map onto the conditional, but which 
would entail its own checking procedures that would override any purely 
arbitrary procedures. 
On the other hand, we anticipated that it might be useful for subjects’ 
solutions of arbitrary problems to teach them correct checking proce- 
dures in the abstract. So long as subjects are able to map the events in a 
problem onto the checking procedures, their mechanical application 
would result in correct solution. Thus, training in an obligation schema 
was expected to improve both problems that are normally interpreted in 
terms of such reasoning schemas and problems that are not (because the 
checking-procedure drill contained in schema training should be effective 
for arbitrary problems as well as for semantically interpretable ones.) In 
contrast, the simple checking-procedure training of the “contingency” 
condition was expected to be useful, if at all, primarily for arbitrary 
problems. 
Method 
Subjects and Procedures 
Seventy-two University of Michigan undergraduates served as paid subjects. Subjects 
were randomly assigned in equal numbers to one of three conditions: a control condition in 
which no training was given, the obligation-training condition, and the contingency-training 
condition. Subjects in the two training conditions were given the appropriate training mate- 
rials to read for ICI min and were then asked to complete the test problems. The control 
subjects were simply given the test problems and asked to complete them. 
Training Materials 
Obligation tmining. Subjects in the obligation-training condition received a two-page 
booklet detailing the nature of obligations and the procedures neccessary for checking if a 
violation of the obligation has occurred. An example of an obligation statement presented in 
the if-then conditional form was given. The procedures for assessing obligations were de- 
scribed in terms of four rules, one for each of the four possible situations that might arise 
(situations that can be mapped onto p, nor-p, 4, and not-q). The full training materials are 
presented in Appendix B. 
Contingency training. The contingency-training materials, also presented in Appendix B, 
were closely matched to the obligation-training materials, except that the checking proce- 
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dures were described in terms of assessment of “contingencies” rather than “obligations.” 
Two examples were provided, one of which was the same as that used in the obligation- 
training materials, and one of which described a contingency between properties associated 
with a category. The contingency-training materials thus provided one more example than 
did the obligation-training materials. Checking procedures were again described in terms of 
four rules that mapped onto the conditional. 
Test Problems 
The test-problem booklet consisted of eight selection problems. presented in Table 6. 
Four of the problems are readily interpretable as obligation situations, and four are rela- 
tively arbitrary. Subjects always received the obligation problems as a block and the arbi- 
trary problems as a block. Order of the blocks was counterbalanced across subjects within 
each training condition. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 7 presents the percentage errors for the two problem types as a 
function of training condition. These results are based on the percentage 
of subjects making at least one error on a problem (i.e., failing to give the 
correct choice, p and not-q). An analysis of variance was performed with 
the three training conditions as a between-subject factor and the two 
problem types (artibrary and obligation) as a within-subject factor. Both 
main effects were highly significant. Subjects made significantly fewer 
errors on obligation problems than on arbitrary problems, F( 1,69) = 
63.0, p < .OOl. Thus, conditional problems that trigger the obligation 
schema, like those that trigger the permission schema, result in higher 
solution rates. Training effects were also highly significant. As antici- 
pated, obligation training produced the best performance, followed by 
contingency training, followed by the control condition that received no 
training, F(2,69) = 5.71, p < .00.5. Analyses of individual types of errors 
yielded a similar pattern, with both the error of selecting q and of omit- 
ting not-q being decreased by obligation training and by obligation con- 
tent. 
The trends apparent in Table 7 indicate that the benefit conveyed by 
obligation training was in part specific to problems interpretable as obli- 
gations. Individual t tests revealed that for obligation problems, training 
in obligations produced performance superior either to contingency 
training or to the no-training control condition, and, as anticipated, the 
mere checking procedure instruction of the contingency-training condi- 
tion produced no detectable improvement for these semantically mean- 
ingful problems. For the arbitrary problems, on the other hand, the ef- 
fects of obligation and contingency training did not differ from each other 
(although only the former produced significantly fewer errors than the 
control condition). A more fine-grained analysis of the response patterns 
for the four arbitrary problems provided further evidence that the effect 
of obligation training varied across problems. For two of the problems 
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TABLE 6 
If-Then Rules of Various Types and Corresponding Choices in the Selection Problems 
(Experiment 3) 
Problem type Rule Choices @, not-p, q, not-q) 
Arbitrary If a card has an “A” on one side, A 
then it has a “4” on the other side B 
4 
7 
If a bird on this island has a purple spot Bird A has a purple spot 
underneath each wing, then it-builds 
nests on the ground 
If a bolt of cloth has any red 
threads in it, then it must be 
stamped with a triangle 
If a house was built before 
1979, then it has a fireplace 
Obligation If a steel support is intended 
for the roof, then it must be 
rustproof 
If any urithium miner gets lung 
cancer, then the company will 
pay the miner a sickness pension 
If any of you wins an athletic 
award, then that person will have 
to treat the others to a round of 
drinks at Sam’s 
If one works for the Armed 
Forces, then one must vote 
in the elections 
underneath each wing 
Bird B does not have any purple 
spots 
Bird C builds nests on the ground 
Bird D builds nests in trees 
Bolt A has red threads in it 
Bolt B has no red threads in it 
Bolt C is stamped with a triangle 
Bolt D is not stamped with a 
triangle 
House A was built before 1979 
House B was built after 1979 
House C has a fireplace 
House D does not have a 
fireplace 
Support A is intended for the 
roof 
Support B is intended for the 
foundation 
Support C is rustproof 
Support D is not rustproof 
Urithium miner A has lung 
cancer 
Urithium miner B does not have 
lung cancer 
Urithium miner C is receiving a 
company sickness pension 
Urithium miner D is not 
receiving a company sickness 
pension 
Person A won a letter in 
basketball 
Person B never played any sport 
Person C treated everyone to a 
round of drinks several times 
Person D has never bought a 
round of drinks 
Person A works for the Armed 
Forces 
Person B does not work for the 
Armed Forces 
Person C voted 
Person D did not vote 
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TABLE 7 
Percentage Errors as a Function of Problem Type and Training Condition (Experiment 3) 
Training condition 
Problem type Control Contingency Obligation x 
Arbitrary 73 55 45 58 2 6 
Obligation 36 34 8 26 ” 6 
x 54 2 12 45 2 12 27 -+ 12 
Note. Error margins indicated in the table are half-widths of 95% confidence intervals for 
the row and column means. The half-width of a 95% confidence interval for pairwise com- 
parisons between row means is 8. The corresponding half-width for pairwise comparisons 
between column means is 17. 
(“red threads” and “fireplace”; see Table 6) the average percentages of 
errors were 60, 50, and 27 for the control, contingency-, and obligation- 
training conditions, respectively. This pattern resembles that for the obli- 
gation problems in that only the difference between obligation training 
and the other two conditions was significant. It seems possible that some 
subjects might have been able to interpret these two problems as obliga- 
tion situations, once they had received training in obligations. In con- 
trast, for the two remaining arbitrary problems (“card” and “bird”), 
which were the most difficult of all, obligation training reduced errors no 
more than did contingency training. Percentages of errors were 85, 60, 
and 58 for control, contingency, and obligation conditions, respectively. 
These results contrast in a very clear way with those of the effects of 
purely abstract training observed in Experiments 1 and 2, in which we 
found that neither a brief rule-training session in the logic of the condi- 
tional nor an entire course in logic had any substantial effect on the way 
subjects dealt with selection problems. In contrast, the two brief proce- 
dures used in Experiment 3 both had substantial effects. First, and most 
importantly, obligation schema training improved subjects’ performance 
on problems that were readily interpretable in terms of the appropriate 
obligation schema. The selective benefit of obligation training extended 
to two of the relatively arbitrary problems which were interpretable in 
terms of the obligation schema. These results support our reasoning 
schema hypothesis. Training in a pragmatic reasoning schema en- 
courages use of that schema for problems that compel a semantic inter- 
pretation consistent with the schema and, in addition, may refine sub- 
jects’ understanding of situations that are potentially interpretable in 
terms of the schema. 
Second, both schema-based training and training in a simple checking 
procedure improved subjects’ performance on the most arbitrary 
problems. Unlike other studies in which orientation toward violation 
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checking provided no benefit for arbitrary problems (Griggs, 1984; 
Yachanin, 1985), the present training procedure provided subjects with in- 
formation as to which cases in fact constituted violations as well as 
simply orienting them toward checking violations. It is noteworthy that 
this brief procedure was effective for at least the arbitrary problems, 
whereas the formal logic instruction in Experiments 1 and 2 was not. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary 
The present results provide support for the view that people typically 
reason using abstract knowledge structures organized pragmatically, 
rather than in terms of purely syntactic rules of the sort that comprise 
standard logic. Subjects reasoned in closer accord with standard logic 
when thinking about problems intended to evoke permission or obligation 
schemas than when thinking about purely arbitrary relations. This pat- 
tern is rather ironic, since standard propositional logic does not capture 
the deontic content of permissions and obligations, whereas it could rep- 
resent relations of the sort described in our arbitrary problems. These 
results on problem types are incompatible with the domain specificity 
view because experience with the precise rules referred to in the permis- 
sion and obligation problems was not necessary for successful perfor- 
mance (Experiments 1 and 3). The results are also incompatible with the 
syntactic view, because all problem types were stated in syntactically 
equivalent forms. 
Our training results provide further evidence favoring the pragmatic 
over the syntactic view. An entire course in standard logic had no effect 
on the avoidance of any error save a slight reduction in the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent. A brief training session in formal logic, of a 
type shown to produce substantial effects on people’s ability to reason in 
accord with the law of large numbers (Fong et al., 1986), had no signifi- 
cant effect on subjects’ ability to use modus ponens or modus tollens or 
to avoid the errors of affirming the consequent or denying the ante- 
cedent. This was not simply because the rule training was inherently use- 
less, since, when it was combined with examples training, subjects were 
able to make substantial use of it. 
The near total ineffectiveness of purely abstract training in logic con- 
trasts dramatically with the ready ease with which people seem able to 
apply a naturally acquired pragmatic reasoning schema. After one se- 
mester’s training in standard logic, the students in Experiment 2 solved 
only 11% of the arbitrary problems correctly, whereas the same students, 
prior to receiving any formal training, solved 62% of the permission 
problems correctly. Moreover, subjects who received a brief training 
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session on the obligation schema improved markedly on selection 
problems interpretable in terms of that schema. 
The generality of the benefit apparently conveyed by evocation of a 
pragmatic schema is also striking. The permission problems yielded sig- 
nificantly fewer errors of all types, including not only the common error 
of failing to select nor-q (equivalent to modus tollens), but also the much 
less frequent error of failing to select p (equivalent to modus ponens). In 
contrast to the benefit conveyed by the evocation of a permission 
schema, a course in logic produced no significant reduction in either of 
these errors. The failure to reduce the frequency of errors for modus 
ponens cannot be attributed to a floor effect, since evocation of the per- 
mission schema did reduce the frequency of errors for the p alternative. 
This failure of abstract training to facilitate use of modus ponens suggests 
that even this rule may not be a general rule of logic for at least some 
subjects. The evidence that modus ponens can be overridden by a 
matching strategy (Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Reich & Ruth, 1982) also 
supports this hypothesis. If modus ponens is not a universal rule of nat- 
ural logic, as our results suggest, it is difficult to imagine any formal de- 
ductive rule that is general across the adult population. In fact, some 
logicians (e.g., Anderson & Belnap, 1975; Nelson, 1933) have objected to 
indiscriminate use of modus ponens to draw inferences across irrelevant 
propositions. Since pragmatic deductive schemas place semantic restric- 
tions on the antecedent and the consequent, inferences involving irrele- 
vant propositions do not occur. 
Possible Criticisms of the Schema Hypothesis 
A critic might argue that to explain performance on the selection task, 
one could simply consider the biconditional or converse bias of various 
if-then statements. (Biconditional bias refers to the tendency to invoke a 
p ifand only ifq interpretation of a given statement ifp then q; converse 
bias refers to the tendency to invoke the ifq then p assumption without 
entailing the contrapositive of either the given ifp then q statement or the 
assumed ifq then p statement.) Both permission and obligation problems 
tend not to invite the biconditional or converse assumption, and one 
might thus argue that their conditional bias is sufficient to explain facilita- 
tion. Henle (1962) has suggested that if invited assumptions are taken into 
consideration, adults if fact reason in accord with standard logic. Others 
have pointed out that certain contexts invite the biconditional interpreta- 
tion of if-then, whereas other contexts do not (Fillenbaum, 1975, 1976; 
Geis & Zwicky, 1971). What, then, warrants an emphasis on the notion of 
reasoning schemas? 
First, an account in terms of invitation of the biconditional cannot in 
fact explain selection performance. As many investigators have pointed 
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out, most patterns of selection are irreconcilable with either the condi- 
tional or the biconditional interpretation of if-rhen. Moreover, our own 
results show that error rate is high even when the problem in fact requires 
treatment as a biconditional (Experiments 1 and 2). Thus, no interpreta- 
tion in terms of standard logic can explain our results. Neither can an 
interpretation in terms of any natural logic. In particular, no natural-logic 
interpretation can explain why the not-q case was selected more often for 
permission and obligation problems than for converse-bias and arbitrary 
problems. Decision on the not-q case is not logically dependent on the 
converse or biconditional assumption, and although a natural logic such 
as Braine’s (1978; Braine et al., 1984) can explain omission of the not-q 
case by some subjects, it cannot explain both the inclusion of the not-q 
case for some problems and its omission in other problems by the same 
subjects. 
Second, if-then statements that have a conditional bias differ in regard 
to the appropriateness of inferring p only ifq from ifp than 4. Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985) showed that when subjects were asked to rephrase if-then 
statements into a logically equivalent form, permission statements such 
as “If you are to enter this country, then you must have an inoculation 
against cholera” were often rephrased into “You are to enter this country 
only if you have an inoculation against cholera.” Now consider an obli- 
gation statement such as, “If an employee is injured at work, then the 
company must pay for medical expenses.” Applying the same syntactic 
transformation as in the above permission statement, we get “An em- 
ployee is injured at work only if the company pays for medical ex- 
penses.” This rephrasing sounds anomalous, because it suggests that the 
company’s payment is a precondition for an employee getting injured. 
More generally, from an obligation statement of the form, “If situation P 
obtains, then one must fulfill obligation Q,” one would not want to infer, 
“Situation P obtains only if one fulfills obligation Q.” In contrast, from a 
permission statement of the form “If one is to take action P, then one 
must satisfy precondition Q, ” one can quite appropriately infer, “One is 
to take action P only if one satisfies precondition Q.” Thus, an inference 
from ifp then q into p only ifq depends crucially on the reasoning schema 
onto which an if-then statement is mapped, even among statements that 
have a conditional bias (also see Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972, pp.73- 
75). This state of affairs is inexplicable in terms of either standard logic or 
natural-logic models. 
Another potential criticism of our schema hypothesis might be based 
on the fact that the schemas that produced the most facilitation in our 
experiments (permission and obligation) all involved checking for viola- 
tions of established rules, rather than testing whether rules were true or 
false. Is there any need to invoke the schema notion rather than simply to 
suppose that violation checking is easier than hypothesis testing? 
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We believe the latter alternative is inadequate for the following 
reasons. As we pointed out in discussing the results of Experiment 3, it 
appears that orientation toward violation checking does not improve per- 
formance unless it is made clear what cases would in fact constitute vio- 
lations. This, of course, is information that regulation schemas of the sort 
we have discussed are able to provide. Moreover, obligation training was 
more effective than contingency training, even though both procedures 
were concerned with violation checking. Therefore, improved violation 
checking cannot account for our results. In addition, the schema hy- 
pothesis predicts that if rules are mapped onto a schema that corresponds 
closely to standard logic, performance in hypothesis testing as well as 
violation checking can be improved. In particular, if a rule is mapped 
onto a causal schema that suggests the presence of multiple deterministic 
causes, people should select relevant evidence in accord with the dictates 
of standard logic (i.e., judging the q case to be irrelevant to the truth of 
the rule, and the not-q case to be potentially falsifying). We would pre- 
dict, for example, that such a pattern would be observed in evaluating a 
hypothesis such as, “If Peter has thrown a vase at Paul, then the vase is 
broken.” In contrast, if the rules in an evoked schema do not correspond 
closely to those in standard logic, then little facilitation will result even if 
the rules check for violations (see Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). 
Relations between Pragmatic Schemas and Other Modes of 
Deductive Reasoning 
Our results speak strongly for the existence of pragmatic schemas, 
since the findings are inexplicable in terms of either the domain speci- 
ficity view or the domain independence view. It is nonetheless conceiv- 
able that multiple types of knowledge relevant to deductive reasoning 
coexist within a population and even within an individual. Our results do 
not rule out this interpretation First, as in other reasoning studies, most 
of our subjects were correct on modus ponens, even in arbitrary 
problems, whereas very few were correct on modus tollens. Although 
modus ponens may not be universal, as discussed above, our results do 
not exclude the possibility that some people may in fact reason with this 
syntactic rule. (See Rips & Conrad, 1983, for evidence of individual dif- 
ferences in the use of deductive rules.) Moreover, the same individuals 
who use ponens as a syntactic rule may use tollens only within the con- 
text of certain pragmatic schemas. Second, familiarity with a rule may 
facilitate performance to some extent, as suggested by the marginal dif- 
ference in selection performance between the two permission problems 
in Experiment 1. The presumably more familiar “drinking age” rule 
yielded slightly better performance than the “cholera inoculation” rule. 
Since familiarity with counterexamples has been shown to be insufficient 
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by itself for facilitation (Manktelow & Evans, 1979), the effect of remem- 
bered counterexamples must be indirect. It seems that familiarity might 
produce facilitation by ensuring that a counterexample was experienced 
as such in the context of a reasoning schema, so that when it is remem- 
bered, the schema is indirectly evoked. 
If pragmatic schemas and syntactic rules coexist, within a population 
as well as within an individual, what determines when alternative types 
of knowledge will be used? We propose that if a rule is interpretable in 
terms of a pragmatic reasoning schema, then a subject will apply the 
schema. If the rule is not interpretable in terms of a reasoning schema, 
however, the subject might fall back on whatever syntactic rules are 
available, or on nonlogical strategies such as “matching”. 
Why Formal Deductive Rules are Difficult to Induce 
In view of our negative conclusion regarding the prevalence of a nat- 
ural logic based on syntactic rules, an obvious question arises: Why are 
such rules apparently difficult to induce? Many logicians throughout the 
centuries have assumed the existence of a natural repertoire of purely 
syntactic logical rules, as have psychologists such as Piaget. Yet appar- 
ently Piaget may have been wrong about people having formal operations 
of deductive logic, but right about them having a schema corresponding 
to the inductive rule system embodied in the law of large numbers. 
The difficulty of inducing deductive rules may appear paradoxical, 
since one typically thinks of deductive rules as being more trustworthy 
than inductive rules. The difficulty is probably not due to greater com- 
plexity of the deductive rules, since there is no a priori reason to think 
that a rule such as modus tollens is more complex than a rough version of 
LLN. Moreover, people are able to apply the equivalent of modus tollens 
in some contexts such as permissions. 
We believe that the contrast between induction of an intuitive version 
of LLN and failure to induce the material conditional reflects the rela- 
tively narrow range of applicability of the material conditional. A rule 
such as, “The information from a random sample is likely to be more 
reliable when the sample is large than when it is small,” is virtually con- 
text independent. The sample can consist of a collection of any stochastic 
events specifying any kind of relationship in any domain. In contrast, 
reliable, useful constancies in deductive rules do not hold at a context-in- 
dependent level. In particular, the abstract concept of the material condi- 
tional-i.e., the formal type of contingency situation invented by logi- 
cians-does not have universal pragmatic value. It has been pointed out 
that the “fallacies” of denying the antecedent and affirming the conse- 
quent often lead to pragmatically useful inferences in many contexts (Fil- 
lenbaum, 1975, 1976; Geis & Zwicky, 1971), Moreover, the “valid” infer- 
ences are not applicable or useful under some conditions. An obligation 
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statement in the form ifp then q seems anomalous when transformed into 
p only ifq, a transformation based on a rule in standard logic. More gen- 
erally, statements that can correspond to the symbols p and q in the rule 
ifp then q are restricted to those that can be true or false (e.g., Quine, 
1974). Imperative and interrogative statements are obviously ruled out. 
(For example, it makes no sense to apply the contrapositive transforma- 
tion to the sentence, “If John cooks dinner, will Susan do the dishes?“) 
For the same reason, rules associated with the material conditional do 
not apply to counterfactual, probabilistic, future contingent, or deontic 
statements. For example, since a deontic statement such as, “If a burglar 
breaks into your house, then you should call the police,” is right or 
wrong rather than true or false, it is outside the scope of standard logic 
(although extended logics may describe such cases). 
Application of rules associated with the material conditional to state- 
ments that are not truth functional may lead to anomalous or useless in- 
ferences. For example, the contrapositive transformation of the above 
deontic statement gives us: “If it is not the case that you should call the 
police, then a burglar does not break into your house”-an inference that 
is useless at best. Similarly, the contrapositive transformation of the fu- 
ture contingent sentence, “If the bomb explodes, then everyone will 
die,” gives us, “If not everyone will die, then the bomb does not ex- 
plode.“Whereas the original sentence, although not truth functional, is a 
meaningful causal prediction, the contrapositive reverses the cause and 
the effect, yielding an anomalous statement (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). 
Not only are rules associated with the material conditional restricted in 
their range of applicability, they are never applied in a natural context to 
antecedents and consequents that are irrelevant to each other, as the 
syntactic form of the rules ought to allow. For example, according to 
standard logic the following statements are all true: (1) If France is in 
Europe, then the sea is salt; (2) If France is in Australia, then the sea is 
salt; (3) If France is in Australia, then the sea is sweet (Quine, 1974, p. 
21). However, even though the formulation of the material conditional 
was motivated by a desire to represent mathematics in a rigorous way, it 
is not applied irrelevantly even in the realm of mathematics.3 
3 Anderson and Belnap (1975, pp. 17-18) relate the following hypothetical anecdote: “A 
mathematician writes a paper on Banach spaces, and . . concludes with a conjecture. As a 
footnote to the conjecture, he writes: ‘In addition to its intrinsic interest, this conjecture has 
connections with other parts of mathematics which might not immediately occur to the 
reader. For example, if the conjecture is true, then the first order functional calculus is 
complete; whereas if it is false, then it implies that Fermat’s last conjecture is correct.’ 
The editor counters ‘In spite of what most logicians say about us, the standards main- 
tained by this journal require that the antecedent of an ‘if then’ statement must be 
relevant to the conclusion drawn.’ ” Anderson and Belnap (1975) have argued that rele- 
vance is critical to one’s intuitive sense of what it is for an argument to be valid. 
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Given the above restrictions on applicability, it should not be sur- 
prising if people typically do not induce some of the syntactic deductive 
rules associated with the material conditional. Unlike inductive rules 
such as the LLN, deductive rules are not context independent. But since 
deductive rules such as those associated with the material conditional do 
hold some of the time, one might still ask, do people induce syntactic 
“probabilistic deductive rules” (a concept that might seem inherently 
contradictory), just as they apparently induce some syntactic probabi- 
listic inductive rules? Our results do not rule out the possibility, any more 
than they rule out the possibility that people may have some “determin- 
istic” syntactic deductive rules; however, they suggest that regardless of 
the exact form of the syntactic rules induced, such rules are overridden 
most of the time by reasoning schemas that pragmatically separate condi- 
tions under which the rules hold from conditions under which they do 
not. 
implications for Education 
Our results have clear educational implications. We have shown that 
deductive reasoning is not likely to be improved by training on standard 
logic. It seems that since there are many conditions under which the 
formal rules do not apply, clarifying when the rules do and do not apply is 
important if students are not to be confused. Unfortunately, the concept 
of truth functionality seems to be extremely difficult to teach, as a small 
sample of logicians we asked concurred. And, although the material con- 
ditional is useful under certain conditions, people seem to lack the knowl- 
edge required to map particular situations onto the syntactic rules. The 
only comfort given by the present results to the possibility that the condi- 
tional may be trainable, in a way that renders it useful for some novel 
problems, is that in Experiment 1 we found that when examples training 
was combined with abstract training, there was some improvement on 
the selection task. The most obvious implication of this result is that, if 
logic instructors wish to influence their students’ inferential behavior in 
the face of novel problems, they must do much more than they currently 
do to show how to apply logical rules to concrete problems. 
But in our view, the material conditional is a largely artificial reasoning 
tool that does not capture and purify natural reasoning. Rather, it offers 
an alternative to it that has pragmatic utility perhaps only for very spe- 
cialized problems of a kind that do not occur frequently in everyday life. 
As an approach to improving everyday reasoning, training on pragmatic 
reasoning schemas seems to us to be more promising. An advantage of 
training based on naturally induced reasoning schemas lies in the prior 
existence of interpretative rules for mapping specific situations onto 
schemas. Moreover, the schemas specify the conditions under which 
certain clusters of rules would apply. Education in reasoning is most 
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likely to be effective when it serves to refine pragmatically useful rules 
that most people will have naturally induced in at least a rudimentary 
form from everyday experiences. 
APPENDIX A: TRAINING MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 1 
Abstract and Abstract Plus Examples Conditions 
In this study we are interested in how people interpret and reason about a very important 
type of logical statement, called the condirional. Even though conditional statements are 
really very simple, people often make errors in dealing with them. These instructions are 
intended to help you understand conditional statements. Read through these instructions 
carefully; they should help you solve some reasoning problems you will receive afterward. 
A conditional statement consists of two component statements which are often joined by 
the conjunctions “if. then.” The conditional statement can be expressed in the standard 
form. 
If P. then q (a) 
where it is understood that the letters “p” and “4” each represent a statement. Statement 
(a) means “if statement p is true, then statement q is also true.” For example, let p stand for 
“It is raining,” and let q stand for “The pavement is wet.” Then (a) says “If it is raining, 
then the pavement is wet.” 
Statement (a) can be expressed in a variety of ways. We will use a horizontal bar above a 
letter to indicate that a statement is not true. For example, “p” means “not p.” One way of 
reformulating (a), then, is 
If ijp then j7. (b) 
This means “if statement q is false, then statement p is also false.” Rephrasing the above 
example into form (b) gives, “If the pavement is nor wet, then it is nor raining.” 
People often don’t realize at first that statements (a) and (b) are equivalent (identical to 
each other). To understand the equivalence of statements (a) and (b), consider the circum- 
stances under which (a) is true. The truth of “lfp. rhen q” depends on the truth of p and q. 
The table below lists the truth values of various statements. Reading across and down the 
table, we see that when p is true and q is also true, then (a) is true (first line). When p is true 
and q is false, then (a) is false (second line), since (a) says that p implies q. So, in order for 
(a) to be true when q is false, p cannot be true (comparing the second and third lines). In 
other words, (a) implies “1f;F, then p.” 
P 4 (a): If p, then q 
T T T 
T F F 
F F T 
Another way of understanding the equivalence of (a) and (b) is through the concept of 
sets. In the following diagrams,4 we will use circles to represent a set, or class of things. We 
will put circles within circles to represent the inclusion of one class within another. For 
example, consider Fig. 1 below: 
4 The materials actually presented are omitted to conserve space. 
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[Euler diagram inserted here] 
Figure 1 represents the fact that oranges are a subset of citrus fruit, which in turn are a 
subset of things containing vitamin C. 
Now, let p stand for the statement “x is an element in the set P,” and let 4 stand for the 
statement “X is an element in the set Q,” That is, “lfp, then 4” means “Ifx is an element in 
the set P, then x is also an element in the set Q.” For what set relation would this statement 
be true? If p is a subset of Q, as illustrated in Fig. 2a, then every element in P would be an 
element in Q. 
[Euler diagrams inserted here.] 
From the same inclusion relation, we can see that if an element x is nor in the set Q, it 
cannot be in the set P (see Fig. 2b). Thus, again we see that (a) is equivalent to (b) (i.e., "If 
p, then q” is equivalent to “Zf ij. then ji”). 
To check your understanding of the conditional statement, please answer the question 
below. 
Statement (a), “If p, then q,” can be rephrased without changing its basic meaning. 
Which of the following is a correct rephrasing of (a)? Put a check next to the correct 
rephrasing(s) before checking the answer on the next page. 
( ) 1. Zfq, then p. 
( ) 2. Ifi?, then q. 
( ) 3. If?, then p. 
Only 3 is a correct rephrasing. You should note that statement (a) “lfp, then 4,” does nor 
imply 
If q, then p. (4 
It is a common error to assume that (a) implies (c). Rephrasing the example on Page I into 
form (cc) gives “If the pavement is wet, then it is raining,” which does nor logically follow 
from “If it is raining, then the pavement is wet.” The pavement may get wet from lawn 
sprinklers nearby, for instance. In terms of set relations, statement (c) would be true only if 
the set P includes the set Q. as in Fig. 3: 
[Euler diagram inserted here.] 
So it should be clear that “Zf p, then q” does not imply “If q, then p.” 
It is also a common error to assume that “If p, then q” implies 
If j?. then 4. (4 
Rephrasing the example on Page 1 into form (d) gives “If it is nor raining, then the pavement 
is not wet,” which again does not follow from “If it is raining, then the pavement is wet,” 
for the same reason we mentioned earlier (e.g., a lawn sprinkler might have made the pave- 
ment wet even though it isn’t raining). 
To sum up, these are the most important facts you need to know about the conditional 
statement. First, statement (a) is equivalent to statement (b): “If p, then q” implies “If ij, 
then p.” Second, statement (a) is not equivalent to either statement (c) or statement (d): “Zf 
p. tfien q” does not imply either “If q, then p” or “if p, then 4.” 
Rephrasing Exercise 
This exercise will check your understanding of the conditional statement. Which of the 
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statement(s) below follow logically from the statement, “If the tablecloth is brown, then the 
wall is white?” Please put a check next to the correct statement(s) below before checking 
the answer on the next page. 
( ) 1. If the tablecloth is nor brown, then the wall is not white. 
( ) 2. If the wall is nor white, then the tablecloth is no? brown. 
( ) 3. If the wall is white, then the tablecloth is brown. 
Only 2 is correct. To see this, we can reformulate the statement into the form “If p, rhen 
q” by substituting p for “the tablecloth is brown” and q for “the wall is white.” Then we 
see that 2 is in the form “1f4, then p,” which we saw earlier is equivalent to “If p, then q.” 
But 1 is in the form “1fp, then 4,” which does not follow from “If p, then 9.” And 3 is in 
the form “If q, rhen p,” which likewise does not follow from “If p, rhen q.” 
Below are two more rephrasing problems. When you are done, check the answer on the 
next page. Statement: If the cube is plastic, then the sphere is metallic. Rephrasings: 
( ) 1. If the sphere is metallic, then the cube is plastic. 
( ) 2. If the cube is nor plastic, then the sphere is not metallic. 
( ) 3. If the sphere is not metallic, then the cube is nof plastic. 
Statement: If the beach is white, then the music is slow. Rephrasings: 
( ) I. If the beach is not white, then the music is nor slow. 
( ) 2. If the music is slow, then the beach is white. 
( ) 3. If the music is nor slow, then the beach is nor white. 
Answer to vephrasiny problems: Only 3 is correct in the above two problems. 
Examples and Abstract plus Examples Conditions 
The two examples below illustrate how the conditional statement is used to solve 
problems. 
Example 1 
As part of your job as an assistant at Sears, you have the task of going through customers’ 
checks to make sure that any check $30 or over has been approved by the section manager. 
The amount is written on the front of the check, while the section manager’s approval is 
initialed on the back of the check. Which of the checks below would you have to turn over 
to make sure that the sales clerk has followed the rule? Turn over only those which you 
need to check the rule. Mark an x below the check(s) you would have to turn over. 
[Alternatives listed here.]=’ 
Please think carefully and solve the problem before checking the answer on the next page. 
Answer to Example 1 
Conditional statement: If the check is $30 or over, then it has to be approved by the 
section manager. The correct answer is (a) and (c). Check (a) obviously needs to be turned 
over. Check (c) also needs to be turned over, because the rule would be violated if the 
check is over $30. If the check is less than $30, as in (b) and (e), we do not care whether or 
not it is approved. And if the check is already approved, as in (d), it doesn’t matter whether 
or not it’s over $30. 
Next Paragraph, Abstract Plus Examples Condition 
To reformulate the rule into the form “Ifp, rhen q.” we substitute p for “the check is $30 
or over,” and q for “it has to be approved by the section manager.” Since alternative (a) 
corresponds to p, we clearly have to check whether q follows. Since (c) corresponds to 4, 
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and “Zf 4, then p” is equivalent to “Zfp, then 4.” we have to check whether p follows. But 
we need not turn over checks (b) and (e), since they correspond top, and, as we said earlier, 
“Zf p, then q” does not imply “Zf .i5, then ;t.” Nor do we need to turn over check (d), which 
translated into q. As you learned earlier, “Zf p. then q” is not equivalent to “Zf q. then p”; 
accordingly, the other side of check (d) is irrelevant to the truth of the rule. 
Example 2 
You are helping to compile illustrations for a book on modem painting. The editor’s 
intention is to illustrate each style with works of several painters, rather than a single 
painter. She suspects, however, that she might have made a slip. She is certain of having 
included several Picasso cubist paintings, but is not sure whether she has illustrated cubism 
by any painter other than Picasso. To check this possibility, she asks you to go through a 
card catalog which you’ve kept for the list of illustrations. On one side of each card is 
written the name of the painter, and on the other side is written the style and title of a 
painting. Which of the four cards below would you need to turn over in order to check her 
suspicion that all the cubist paintings are by Picasso? In other words, you need to find out 
whether it is the case that if the painting is cubist, then it is a Picasso. 
[alternatives listed here] 
When you are done, check the answer on the next page. 
Answer to Exercise 2 
Conditional statement: If the painting is cubist, then it is a Picasso. The correct answer is 
to turn over cards (c), (d), and (e). Card (c) should obviously be checked. Cards (d) and (e) 
should also be checked, since Metzinger and Leger might be cubist painters, in which case 
the conditional statement would be violated. Card (a) need not be checked since it won’t 
help if the Picasso painting is cubist and it is irrelevant if the Picasso painting is not cubist. 
The surrealist card is obviously irrelevant. 
Next Paragraph, Abstract Plus Examples Condition 
To reformulate the above conditional statement into the form “Zf p, rhen 4.” we substi- 
tute p for “the painting is cubist,” and q for “the painting is a Picasso.” Since card (c) 
translates into p. we clearly have to check whether q follows. And since cards (d) and (e) 
translate into 4, and “Zf 4, then j7’ is equivalent to “Zf p, rhen q,” we have to check 
whether j? follows. But we need not turn over card (a), since it corresponds to q, and “Zf q, 
rhen p” does not follow from “Zf p. then 4.” Accordingly, the backside of card (a) is 
irrelevant to the truth of “Zf p, rhen q.” Similarly, we need not turn over card (b), which 
corresponds to p, a condition whose implications are irrelevant to the truth of “Zf p. 
then 4.” 
APPENDIX B: TRAINING MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 3 
Obligation Condition 
In this experiment you will be asked to solve a series of problems involving decisions 
about what needs to be checked in various situations in order to see whether specified 
regularities hold. In particular, you will need to apply what you know about regulations 
involving obligations of various sorts. In order to help you with the problems that will 
follow, please study the following description of the rules required to properly enforce obli- 
gations. Obligations are deceptively simple. Thus, although you probably already know 
what obligations are, these rules will help you think about such stiuations. 
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Obligations 
As you know, an obligation arises whenever it is the case that certain circumstances or 
situations create an obligation to perform some action. Obligations can often be stated in an 
“If. . then” form. For example, the following regulation specifies an obligation: “If a 
student is a psychology major, then the student must take an introductory psychology 
course.” More generally, if we call the initial situation I and the action C, an obligation has 
the form, “If I arises, then C must be done.” In our first example, I is “being a psychology 
major,” and C is “taking an introductory psychology course.” 
In order to assess whether an obligation is being satisfied, we need to consider the four 
possible situations that might arise. These are 
1. I occurs. 
2. I doesn’t occur. 
3. C is done. 
4. C is not done. 
Corresponding to each of these possible situations is a rule related to the fulfillment of the 
obligation. These rules are the following: 
1. If I occurs, then it is obligatory to do C. Clearly, if I arises then failure to take the 
required action would constitite a violation of the obligation. To use our example. if a 
student is a psychology major, then that student must take an introductory psychology 
course. 
2. If I does not occur, then the obligation does not arise. Consequently, C need not be 
done, although the person may do C anyway. For example, if a student is not a psychology 
major the student is not obliged to take an introductory psychology course. It may be per- 
missible, however, for an English major to take an introductory psychology course. But in 
any case, the basic obligation is simply irrelevant if the student is not a psychology major. 
3. If C is done, then the obligation is certainly not violated, regardless of whether or not I 
has occurred. If I did occur, then the obligation is satisfied. If I didn’t occur, then the 
obligation didn’t even arise (Rule 2). For example, if we know a student has taken an intro- 
ductory psychology course, we can be sure the obligation has not been violated: Either the 
student was a psychology major, and hence fulfilled the obligation, or the student was not a 
psychology major, in which case the obligation didn’t arise. 
4. If C has not been done, then I must not have occurred. This is because if I had oc- 
curred, then the failure to do C would constitute a violation of the obligation. Thus, if a 
student has not taken an introductory psychology course, the student must not be a psy- 
chology major, or else the obligation will have been violated. 
If you understand the above four rules, you should find it very easy to assess whether or 
not an obligation is being met. Note that there are only two situations in which it is possible 
for an obligation to be violated: When I occurs (and C is not done) (Rule I), and when C is 
not done (and I occurs) (Rule 4). In the other two situations the obligation can’t be violated. 
These are the cases in which I doesn’t occur (in which case the obligation doesn’t arise) 
(Rule 2), and in which C is done (in which case the obligation will have been met if it arose) 
(Rule 3). 
You may wish to reread these instructions carefully in order to be sure you understand 
the rules for evaluating obligations. You will then be able to apply what you learned to the 
test problems. The test problems will include both obligations and other similar types of 
regularities. You will find it easy to solve these problems if you carefully apply Rules l-4. 
Contingency Condition 
In this experiment you will be asked to solve a series of problems involving decisions 
about what needs to be checked in various situations in order to see whether specified 
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regularities hold. In particular, you will need to apply what you know about situations 
involving contingencies of a certain sort. In order to help you with the problem\ that will 
follow, please study the following description of the rules required to properly evaluate 
contingencies. Contingencies are deceptively simple. Thus, although you probably already 
know what contingencies are, these rules will help you think about such situations more 
systematically. 
Contingencies 
A contingency arises whenever it is the case that a certain condition implies some neces- 
sary consequence. Contingencies can be stated in an “If. . . then” form. For example, the 
following statement specifies a contingency: “If a mushroom is red, then it is edible.” 
Another example would be “If a student is a psychology major, then the student must take 
an introductory psychology course.” More generally, if we call the initial condition I and 
the consequence C, a universal contingency has the form, “If I, then C.” In our first ex- 
ample, I is “red mushroom” and C is “edible.” In the second example, I is “being a 
psychology major,” and C is “taking an introductory psychology course.” 
In order to assess whether a contingency in fact holds, we need to consider the four 
possible situations that might arise. These are 
1. I is obtained. 
2. Z is not obtained. 
3. C is obtained. 
4. C is not obtained. 
Corresponding to each of these possible situations is a rule related to the truth of the 
contingency. These rules are the following: 
1. If Z is obtained, then C must be obtained. Clearly, if Z is obtained then for C not to 
obtain would show that the contingency doesn’t hold. To use our examples, if a mushroom 
is red, then it must be edible or else the contingency is false; and if a student is a psychology 
major, then the student must take an introductory psychology course. 
2. If Z is not obtained, then the contingency is not tested. C need not obtain, although it 
may. For example, if a mushroom is not red, it need not be edible, although it may be 
(perhaps brown mushrooms are also edible). Similarly, if a student is not a psychology 
major the student need not take an introductory psychology course. It may be possible, 
however, for an English major to take an introductory psychology course. But in any case, 
the basic contingency is simply irrelevant if the student is not a psychology major. 
3. If C is obtained, then the contingency is certainly not falsified, regardless of whether 
or not Z obtains. If Z did occur, then the contingency is satisfied. If Z is not obtained, then the 
contingency wasn’t even tested (Rule 2). For example, if we know a certain mushroom is 
edible, we can be sure the contingency was not falsified regardless of the mushroom’s color: 
Either the mushroom is red, and the contingency is satisfied, or it is not red, in which case 
the contingency was not tested. Similarly, if we know a student has taken an introductory 
psychology course, we can be sure the contingency has not been falsitied: Either the stu- 
dent was a psychology major, and hence satisfied the contingency, or the student was not a 
psychology major, in which case the contingency wasn’t tested. 
4. If C is not obtained, then Z must not obtain or else the contingency is falsified. This is 
because if Z had occurred, then the failure to obtain C would falsify the contingency. Thus, 
if a mushroom is not edible, it must not be red or else the contingency is false. And if a 
student has not taken an introductory psychology course, the student must not be a psy- 
chology major, or else again the contingency will be falsified. 
If you understand the above four rules, you should find it easy to assess whether or not a 
contingency is being satisfied. Note that there are only two situations in which it is possible 
for a contingency to be falsified: When Z is obtained (and C is not obtained) (Rule l), and 
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when C is not obtained (and I is obtained) (Rule 4). In the other two situations the contin- 
gency can’t be falsified. These are the cases in which I does not obtain (in which case the 
contingency is not tested) (Rule 2), and in which C is obtained (in which case the contin- 
gency will have been satisfied if it was tested) (Rule 3). 
You may wish to reread these instruction carefully in order to be sure you understand the 
rules for evaluating contingencies. You will then be able to apply what you learned to the 
test problems, which will include a variety of types of such contingencies. You will find it 
easy to solve these problems if you carefully apply Rules 1-4. 
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